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A solution to the “hard problem” requires taking the point of view of the organism and its sub-
agents. The organism constructs phenomenality through acts of fiat, much as we create meaning 
in language, through the use of symbols that are assigned meaning in the context of an embodied 
evolutionary history. Phenomenality is a virtual representation, made to itself by an executive 
agent (the conscious self), which is tasked with monitoring the state of the organism and its 
environment, planning future action, and coordinating various sub-agencies. Consciousness is not 
epiphenomenal and serves a function for higher organisms that is distinct from unconscious 
processing. While a strictly scientific solution to the hard problem is not possible for a science 
that excludes the subjectivity it seeks to explain, there is hope to at least informally bridge the 





The “hard problem of consciousness” [Chalmers 1995] is the challenge to explain 
phenomenal experience scientifically—that is, in physical terms of neural processes. 
Beginning with Leibniz, it has seemed to many that there is an unbridgeable categorical 
gulf between one’s conscious subjective experience and objective events in the brain that 
are presumed to cause it. Even though many “neural correlates of consciousness” have 
been identified, it remains unclear how physical processes of any sort could cause or 
bring about vivid conscious subjective states such as feelings, sensory experience of 
color, smell, sound, and touch, as well as more subtle experiences such as memories, 
mental images, volition, thoughts, and dreams. Many factors conspire to make the hard 
problem hard, including cultural and psychological conditioning, philosophical biases, 
and a narrow view of causality.1 I shall argue that one in particular renders a solution 
virtually impossible—at least as things stand. This is the fact that science has long 
banished the subjective and the mental from its ontology of efficient causes, transmitted 
passively through material systems, while insisting that mind must ultimately be 
explained in the terms of such an ontology. However, in recent decades the mental has re-
entered scientific discussion by the back door, namely through the computational 
metaphor, which enables insight into the active role of mind in constructing phenomenal 
experience. At the same time that computers changed our view of the mental, advances in 
brain imaging made it plausible to identify neural “mechanisms” thought to be 
responsible for subjective states. However, the significance of computation as an 
approach to mind is less that it assimilates mind or brain to a machine than that an 
engineering strategy enables the designer or programmer to understand the system from 
                                                
1 For a further exploration of such factors, see [Bruiger 2017]. 
an insider’s point of view. To inquire how a physical organism can be conscious is to ask 
how Mother Nature, as designer, does the trick.2 The best attempt at an answer may be to 
put oneself in the organism’s place, which is more of an engineering approach than a 
strictly scientific one.  
 Ever since Descartes, however, there has been a general objection to this sort of 
strategy, which substitutes a conscious human point of view for that of a natural system. 
In particular, to suppose an already-conscious agent within the head does nothing to 
explain consciousness.3 (For, then, the consciousness of that being must be explained, in 
an indefinite regression.) The problem is rather to explain how any agent can be 
conscious at all, and under what circumstances. Yet, clearly it will make a difference 
whether “agency” is considered from the extrinsic point of view of an observer, who sees 
only a physical system, or from the point of view of the agent itself, operating on its own 
terms. In other words: whether the task facing the brain (to produce phenomenal 
experience) is considered from a third-person or a first-person point of view. I will argue 
that there is no regression problem, that the agent is only incidentally a physical system, 
and that the present approach can bring us as close as possible to understand how the 
brain produces experience. The challenge I address is not to explicate neurological 
structures or physical processes that underwrite consciousness, but to understand how an 
agent can be conscious. This, we will see, is through the active nature of mental agency 
as original cause—the very opposite of the traditional passivity of the physical. 
 
 
2. The Cartesian theater 
 
The idea of representation is central to some modern theories of cognition. The 
undesirable implication of an inner audience for inner representations is incidental to 
such theories. It comes from thinking of the representation as something given outright, 
encountered as though it were an already existing thing, a re-presentation of something 
external: a ready-made image with a ready-made witness for it. But the view presented 
here is that the agent makes the image, for its own purposes, rather than finding it. The 
strategy here substitutes a conscious human point of view for that of the agent in 
question, to understand why it does this. There is no regression of observers within 
observers because the “homunculus” is the investigator, not some part of the system 
investigated.  
  
                                                
2 While Daniel Dennett’s [1987/1998] strategy is to assimilate intentional states to natural 
design—to “what Mother Nature had in mind”—the strategy I advocate here is to assimilate 
“natural design” to (human) intentional states. Rather than second-guess the “intentions” of 
natural selection, I propose to put oneself in the place of an agent tasked with designing itself.  
3 There have also been many legitimate objections to considering the brain in isolation from the 
body, and to the computational metaphor because it likens the brain literally to a disembodied 
computer. These are not the issues I address here. Rather, I assume from the outset that the brain 
is an organ of the body, embedded in an environment with which the organism’s present and 
historical interactions are crucial for its behavior and perception, and therefore for its conscious 
experience. I use “brain” as an abbreviation for the cognitive system of an embodied 
environmentally embedded organism with an evolutionary history. 
 
3. Phenomenality4 and scientific reduction 
 
Reduction seems unproblematic so long as phenomenality is tacitly ignored and only 
facts derived from it are considered reducible to other propositions. But when 
phenomenality itself is what is to be scientifically reduced, the vicious circle bites back. 
For, phenomenality is then to be reduced to concepts derived from it in the first place. 
 Phenomenality is foremost sensory experience of the external world, mixed with 
various body sensations, emotions, memory, imagination, and self-talk formalized as 
reasoning and thought. Each of these experiences is the activity of an agent, for which 
there is “something it is like” to be doing them [Nagel 1974].  
Reasoning and thought led to science, as a formal conceptualized version of 
cognition. The hard problem presumes this conceptualized version that we call ‘physical 
reality’, and then asks how phenomenality arises from it. This is now widely considered a 
scientific question, which implies it should have an experimentally testable answer. Yet, 
the question could with equal validity be put the other way around: how and why does 
everyday phenomenality give rise to the scientific worldview? Formulated in the present 
tense, the how is an epistemic question. In the past tense, it becomes a question for the 
historian of science. With emphasis on the why, it becomes a problem in psychology, 
sociology, or perhaps evolutionary psychology.  
The hard problem is rendered hard by various motivations and presumptions 
underlying the scientific worldview. Since science originated in expurgating the 
subjective to produce an account of the world deemed objective, it is at least odd to ask 
how the subjective “emerges” from the objective or is caused by it. The question could 
mean: how can one recover or reconstitute the original subjective version from the 
objectified one? The appropriate answer would be: through an inverse of the process 
through which it was objectified in the first place. But the hard problem asks instead how 
the brain (not society or the whole person) produces (not recovers) the phenomenal 
experience that now appears mysterious in a world defined to lack it. As such, the quest is 
set up for failure. 
 Let us admit from the start that the scientific worldview (with the physicist’s 
ontology) is fundamental by convention only. Science is an alternative form of cognition, 
motivated by need of the human organism to improve upon sensory perception and to 
enable control of nature. To serve that purpose, it agrees to bracket the subject and focus 
upon the object. This does violence to the fundamental truth that all cognition is co-
determined by subject and object conjointly. Physics, especially, confines the relevance 
of consciousness to the role of the idealized observer, a mere fly on the wall.  
 However, scientific explanation is a narrative; it is communication (at the least, 
from one scientist to another) whether in a natural or in a formal (mathematical) 
language. The structure of both is based on common perceptual experience: language 
usually contains nouns to represent objects, adjectives to describe qualities, verbs to 
represent interactions, etc. Formal systems contain parallel elements more abstractly. 
                                                
4 I use ‘phenomenality’ to refer to the entire domain of what can enter consciousness, which 
includes sensory experience, emotion, imagination and memory, dreams, thought, etc. In short, 
everything for which there is “something it is like” to be in that state. 
 
Scientific theories consist of propositions, which someone proposes. The communicator 
speaks in the first person, to someone addressed who constitutes the second person, about 
the phenomenon investigated, which constitutes the (depersonalized) third person.5 By 
taking them for granted, scientific protocol tacitly brackets the first- and second-person 
aspects of scientific communication in order to focus on the third-person object of the 
communication. This works well enough unless the object is phenomenality itself, which 
necessarily entails the first and second persons.6 The refusal to admit subjective 
experience and teleology into the scientific protocol obviates a scientific explanation of 
consciousness. A corollary of this refusal is the exclusive focus on efficient cause, with 
the metaphysical implication that matter is inherently passive. At the very least, a science 
that incorporates the role of the subject would be a more complete science [Bruiger 2014, 
2016].   
 The reductive program reflects a bias: that physics is held to describe what is 
“real” while phenomenality is a sort of illusion produced by the brain. Of course, the 
science of physics is also produced by the brain, but we don’t for that consider it an 
illusion. Rather, we hold it to be our best account of the world—one made by disciplined 
conscious effort instead of the less reliable account made naturally and unconsciously by 
the brain’s processing of sensory information. It thus remains our bias that phenomenal 
experience is to be explained ultimately by physics and not the other way around. We 
seek to know how the brain produces phenomenality while implicitly thinking of the 
brain as a physical system that can produce only a behavioral output. To understand how 
the brain (or the organism as a whole) can be subject and agent as well as material object 
will involve putting ourselves as subjects (and agents) in its place, to inquire how we 
would go about creating phenomenal experience. Effectively, this is the strategy of 
artificial intelligence, which attempts to understand natural intelligence by reproducing it. 
It means identifying what a human engineer would do to create an output judged to be the 
“same” behavior. Applied to human consciousness, the task becomes to find what the 
scientist must do to re-produce her own phenomenality.  
 
 
4. An executive role for consciousness 
 
The hard problem is that a causal explanation is sought for processes that are essentially 
not causal but intentional. One could say that they occur in a virtual rather than a material 
system. Explanation then cannot consist of identifying efficient causes passively 
transmitted throughout a physical system. Rather, the system itself, and its subsystems, 
must be considered agents, which are original first causes. Since these have a point of 
                                                
5 One speaks in the third person to refer to depersonalized elements of reality. However, in 
natural language, developed by a highly social species, the “third” person is historically a literal 
person talked about rather than to. The notion of cause had once been correspondingly personal: 
someone was considered responsible for extraordinary occurrences (whether beneficial or 
malevolent), while ordinary occurrences needed no explanation—as reflected in Aristotle’s ideas 
on causality. The scientific revolution adopted a different understanding of causality and rejected 
personification of the natural world. 
6 Phenomenality is by definition first-personal. When it becomes an object of thought to be 
reported, it is also an object of communication and therefore second-personal.  
view of their own, the appropriate strategy is to identify with that point of view in order 
to embrace the challenges facing the active system.  
 Such a strategy need not involve an indefinite regression of agents within agents. 
On the contrary, it points to a special executive function within the brain, where the buck 
stops. This function might be likened to the CEO of a corporation, who is responsible for 
decisions on the highest level, based on “reports” provided by conditionally reliable 
subalterns. The job of this executive is to monitor and trouble-shoot the overall operation 
of the system, to plan ahead on various time scales, and to take charge in situations where 
established protocols are inadequate. To consider the point of view of this executive 
function (by substituting for it the observer’s conscious point of view) entrains no logical 
regression, because it would be pointless for a subsystem to display to itself the same 
information it provides to the executive. However, it is still possible to ask why this 
executive function could not be performed unconsciously, as we assume is the case for 
subsystems. What is there about the executive function that requires phenomenality and 
conscious volition? What is it about phenomenality that makes the difference between 
conscious and unconscious processing? Or, to put it bluntly, what are qualia good for? 
Whether or not to answer such questions would solve the hard problem (how the brain 
produces qualia), it would surely shed light on it. 
 The hard problem involves the psychological obstacle that thinking of the brain as 
a physical system seems incompatible with thinking of it as a conscious agent. Yet, of 
course, we know that the human organism is in fact a conscious agent. If we are to 
propose the executive function as responsible for this fact, we must think of it not only as 
a physical organ, subsystem, or “third person”, but rather as we think of our own 
consciousness, in terms of agency and from a first-person point of view. The heuristic 
purpose of the present strategy is to put oneself in its shoes, so to speak, in order to 
discover how its reasons and reasoning imply phenomenality. In other words: to 
understand why there must be “something it is like” to be this executive, and why its job 
could not be performed unconsciously. We want to identify what sets it apart from non-
conscious processes. 
 One thing that could set it apart is that its algorithms might not be pre-
programmed, but formed in real time. Immediate attention demanded by some alarum is 
often accompanied by a pre-programmed quick first response. Beyond that, however, the 
demand itself also puts the executive on notice for future short-term and long-term 
planning. The monitoring capacity of the executive also entails directing attention where 
it is not externally demanded, and on a time scale permitting deliberate re-programming 
(reason and reflection). The executive makes use of both symbolic and iconic forms of 
representation in preparing the next action or next step in planning, just as a CEO uses 
charts, graphs, and reports. Phenomenality summarizes the “data” and the decision 
process up to the present moment. 
 A great deal of human behavior is performed without conscious attention. We 
experience the results of neural processing but not the processing itself. Since some of 
this processing leads to conscious experience and some not, what makes the difference?   
Conscious attention seems to be required in novel, complex, or otherwise mobilizing 
situations. If the action cannot be done by rote, confronts a novel or demanding situation, 
or requires planning and forethought, conscious attention is brought into play. This 
suggests that phenomenality makes real-time sensory input available to higher centers for 
planning or dealing with novelty or emergency. One role of consciousness is to muster 
additional resources to deal with situations that are not already handled by existing 
strategies—to gain new mastery, to learn improved algorithms.7 Formal reasoning can be 
more precise (as in mathematical calculation) than non-conscious processing, which is 
faster but probabilistic.8 Conscious problem solving is slow because its processing 
involves many steps and coordinates more areas of the brain, which are farther apart. A 
visual process, for example, seems to be conscious if it involves information shared over 
a key distance of 10 cm in the human brain [Lamme 2015, sec9]. 
 Consciousness plays a different role than behavioral responses that can occur 
without it, and presumably involves different or additional neural processes. Many motor 
tasks are executed “automatically,” and one is sometimes conscious of performing an 
action that seems to “do itself.” Though awareness of initiating voluntary action comes 
after the neural processes that have actually caused it, this awareness serves as the basis 
for choosing future action, or action in a larger context [Frith and Metzinger 2013]. Thus, 
consciousness is not epiphenomenal. 
 Planning, forethought, and reasoning obviously involve conscious attention, as do 
mobilizing alarums, suggesting that consciousness serves to coordinate and integrate sub-
systems.9 The agent that does this is known to itself and others as the “self” of that 
individual [Metzinger 2010, p29]. Though it cannot take full responsibility for the actions 
of the organism as a whole, it appropriates an identity with the body and is often held 
accountable by others. It is more than a figurehead but less than an absolute monarch. It 
is a sort of virtual avatar of the organism, tasked with monitoring a real-time virtual 
representation of external reality and the organism’s relationship to it. Consciousness is 
also closely bound up with memory [Lockwood 1998, p84]; it serves as a registration 
system for information coming into the system, which can then be tagged for future 
retrieval.  
 Yet, one may still ask: Why could there not be a non-conscious executive 
function, and non-conscious monitoring, just as there can be perception outside of 
consciousness? A possible clue lies in the responsibility of the executive function as 
decision maker. Sensory information available to the organism is essentially probabilistic 
and ambiguous. Yet, it is crucial for the organism, as for a corporation or government, 
that such information must nevertheless lead to decisive action. This means deciding 
unequivocally what is perceived, as opposed to probabilistic estimating of non-conscious 
processes. What the conscious self perceives is ideally unambiguous, even at the cost of 
being wrong.10 And what renders something certain is ultimately no more than the 
                                                
7 In effect, homeostatically, to restore a state no longer requiring consciousness! [Solms, p179; 
Lamme 2015, sec11]  
8 Non-conscious visual perception in blindsight, for example, involves experimental results that 
are better than random but far less than certain. 
9 It seems to involve a synchronous broadcasting of information globally, especially to parts of 
the parietal and prefrontal cortices [Kandel 2012, p464-5] and also seems to be closely associated 
with particular features of the brain, including the claustrum, a sheet of neural tissue in contact 
with most of the cortical areas, which may even serve as an “on-off” switch for consciousness 
[Koubeissi et al 2014]. 
10 Consider the Necker cube and other unstable figures, which at any given moment appear 
definitely one way or another. 
assertion that it is so.11 Moreover, there should be only one boss who decides; it would 
not be functional to have multiple seats of consciousness competing in the organism.  
 
 
5. The virtual reality metaphor 
 
Computation has served as a fruitful, if limiting, metaphor to explore the nature of mind. 
A computer can produce a virtual reality (VR), which may serve to explain, at least 
metaphorically, how the brain generates phenomenality [Lehar 2003a; Metzinger 2009]. 
If the mind is a virtual machine running on the wet-ware of the brain, then perhaps what 
we know as phenomenality is a virtual reality (VR) generated by the brain.  
 An obvious difficulty with this metaphor is that actual VR is a simulation made 
externally via an interface with the user’s senses. In the metaphor, however, the brain is 
both the creator and the user of the experience. To apply the VR metaphor properly, we 
must switch from thinking of it as an artifact for a human observer’s use to thinking of it 
as a simulation the brain creates for its own use. Moreover, the brain’s VR is not an 
imitation of external reality, although it is experienced as external reality happening in 
real external space. We quite normally have, so to speak, an “out-of-brain experience” 
[Revonsuo 2006].  
 Another problem for the VR metaphor lies in the temptation to imagine a sort of 
hologram dancing inside the skull (which then requires an inner witness). While the VR 
is by definition first-personal as an experience, it is also third-personal as a program. An 
observer would not see the VR through the subject’s eyes but would see only the subject 
wearing VR goggles, the computer, etc. Confusing these viewpoints can lead to 
absurdity, which has not prevented one commentator from claiming that “out beyond the 
walls and floor and ceiling of the room I saw around me was the inner surface of my true 
physical skull, and beyond that skull was an immensely remote external world, of which 
this world that was in my experience was merely a miniature virtual reality replica.” 
[Lehar, 2003b].  
 A third problem, then, lies in thinking of the VR as a replica of the external 
world. The notion implies comparing two things: the copy and the original. But the brain 
cannot get outside the skull to verify the copy by comparing it directly to the original. 
Indeed, the brain’s natural VR is not a “copy” at all, but an original creation that serves to 
guide the organism in navigating a putative external world. It functions like a map, based 
on data collected through interaction with whatever lies “out there.” It is a theory of the 
external world, whose accuracy can only be measured by its success in permitting the 
survival of the organism. In sum, the brain creates its VR (phenomenality) as an efficient 
way to monitor the world, the body, and their relationship. How, then, does it do this? 
 Since the brain is literally sealed within the skull, to navigate the world it must 
“fly blind,” possibly making use of a model it has devised of what lies outside a cockpit 
                                                
11 Cf. [Frith & Metzinger 2013]: “Only conscious experience… can represent something as real 
and as taking place now… There could be unconscious models… and they could certainly be 
characterized by a high degree of Bayes optimality. But only misrepresenting the probability of a 
hypothesis as 1.0 and simultaneously flagging it as a fact holding now via a window of presence 
turns a possibility (or a likelihood) into a reality.” 
that offers no direct view.12 To literally put ourselves in the place of the brain, let us 
entertain a thought experiment. Imagine a subject sealed within a windowless 
compartment, with no exit, connected to the outside world via diverse “sensors” that 
supply only streams of digital information. The chamber is also equipped with various 
“effectors” of unknown function. The subject may find that activating an effector changes 
the sensory input. (In real life, “mistakes” in this trial-and-error process may end in the 
termination of the experiment; here we treat this as a repeatable game in which the player 
can “die” and reset to begin again.) The subject’s task is to continue in the game, by 
correlating incoming data streams with outgoing commands in such a way as to avoid 
“game over.” How might one proceed? 
 A first approach would obviously be simple trial and error until effective 
correlations are established that can be hard-wired. Greater flexibility could be achieved 
by constructing a theoretical model to account for observed patterns, so that predictions 
from this model can be tested by trying specific outputs. The model compresses a vast 
amount of data acquired through trial and error; its predictions can be compared with 
current input to update it, like a dynamic map. While that would be a laborious 
procedure, a user-friendly additional step would be a VR version of the theoretical model, 
which summarizes all the previous procedures and becomes an efficient interface with the 
putative external world. A first key point is that this VR is “true,” or “resembles” the 
outside environment, just to the extent it permits continuance in the game. A second key 
point is that the subject in this interactive exercise will inevitably come to experience the 
VR as a real external world.  
 A virtual reality is a simulation, which involves limited detail, since it runs on a 
finite program; whereas natural reality may be indefinitely detailed. Perhaps one reason 
why VR entertainment is engaging—and its coarse-graining serves well enough—is that 
sensory experience itself is normally impressionistic. When attending to a visual scene, 
for example, it is the overall impression and the feeling it evokes that constitute the 
experience, not an exhaustive registration of all detail. It is an illusion that we fully and 
uniformly see all that is before the eyes. We see that there is detail, often without putting 
a finer point on it.13 To the extent that a VR can present sufficient detail to give that sort 
of impression, it can pass as a substitute for sensory experience. By the same token, 
sensory experience itself is actually highly selective and digitized, but gives the 
impression of continuity and indefinite detail. One may think of the brain’s natural 
simulation as an illusion, but there is nothing outside it to set a standard of comparison 
except the truths of science, which ultimately also can only be measured by evolutionary 
success.  
 We understand how a literal machine can produce an illusory experience for the 
human user of the device, because we have constructed systems that do this. The 
challenge here is rather to grasp how the brain can produce such an illusion for its own 
                                                
12 Before the development of computerized flight simulators, the situation of the brain sealed in 
the skull was metaphorized by Keith Oatley [1978] as a pilot flying by instrument. Maturana & 
Varela [1980] also proposed that the organism simply tries to maintain a certain configuration of 
sensory input by means of its motor output. Metzinger [2009, p108] likens the situation of the 
brain to that of a “total flight simulator, a self-modelling aeroplane that, rather than being flown 
by a pilot, generates a complex internal image of itself within its own internal flight simulator.” 
13 We return to this question in section 10. 
use. The question is how there comes to be an actual view from the brain’s point of view, 
how there comes to be “something it is like” from that viewpoint.  
  
 
6. Intentional connection 
 
To answer that question, I propose that the brain makes internal connections on its own 
initiative: it is an agent rather than a patient (in the archaic sense of the term). Its 
processes are intentional as well as causal. This distinction itself is a matter of point of 
view: cause is observed by a third person; intention is the act of a first person. Since these 
are ways of looking, they do not logically exclude each other. However, science has in 
practice excluded the first-person perspective, in favor of third-person description. It is 
primarily this exclusion that hinders the scientific understanding of consciousness. 
 A second hindrance is the traditional understanding of intentionality, derived from 
Brentano, which is based on language usage. While statements are about something, it is 
not words that refer, but speakers. Reference (“aboutness”) is not a property inhering in 
symbols but an action performed by an agent. An observer may identify internal 
connections as representing elements of the external world, which are significant to the 
organism as an environment full of consequence for it. But such reference resides in the 
making of the connection, not in the representing symbols themselves, which have no 
“pre-existing intentionality” [Kuipers 2007, p86].  
The internal “language” of the organism is not merely syntactic, because the 
organism is motivated to survive. All meaning—including the meaning implicit in 
phenomenality—reflects the active relationship of the creature to a world upon which it 
critically depends. The meaning to itself of its internal communications is analogous to 
the meaning that emerges for a human language user in the act of reading or writing, of 
speaking or listening to speech, in which the communicator translates linguistic symbols 
(written or aural) into mental images, thoughts, and feelings—or vice versa. The brain 
assigns meaning to its internal connections, thereby evoking phenomenality in much the 
way that words evoke mental images. Symbolic ciphers are translated as conscious 
experience. But how? 
 In natural language, sounds and symbols carry meaning as words by deliberate 
convention. Similarly, algebraic symbols gain numerical significance by the 
mathematician’s fiat: ‘let x stand for such and such…’ Phenomenal qualities are 
comparable to intelligible meanings carried by means of a constructive fiat, similar to the 
emergence of meaning from the babble of spoken syllables or the squiggles on a written 
page. Pain, for example, represents something (e.g., tissue damage) as well as compelling 
a response. We do not normally question the reasons for our own neural connections, to 
which we do not have conscious access. Yet, it is only from a third-person perspective 
that they appear arbitrary, merely conventional or uncompelling, because the observer is 
then not in the position of being the agent that makes the connection. As in the case of a 
foreign language, it may then appear mysterious that such apparently meaningless 
connections carry meaning.  
 The creation of sensory experience is like the creation of mental imagery in 
response to language or giving rise to it. There is a resemblance between full-blown 
sensory images and their subtler cousins, mental images. Of course, simply pointing to 
the similarity does not explain what they do and do not have in common. Yet, their very 
differences may provide a clue to what is required for sensory phenomenality.  
 One difference stands out: mental images convey only the detail they already 
embody from prior input. Unlike a sensory image, a memory or visual imagining cannot 
be searched for more propositional information than it already graphically presents and 
stores. A retinal image, in contrast, is constantly updated in real time (or nearly), and so is 
an ongoing source of new data. The visual field itself changes as the world changes, but 
is also continually refreshed through eye saccades. Somehow this constant renewal of an 
external source of sensory input provides a vivid experience of reality, as distinguished 
from paler imagination and memory. But another factor also characterizes sensory 





Embodiment is more than physical instantiation. It is a relationship of an agent with the 
world, whether established through the present interaction of the individual or the 
interaction of the kind over generations of natural selection. The meaning to the organism 
of its internal communications derives ultimately from its evolutionary history. It 
involves potential consequences of events for the organism. That these consequences 
mean something to the organism implies valuation, particularly with respect to potential 
action. To the fly, the descending swatter means “get out of the way.” The fly does not 
need to have phenomenal experience, think, or make a conscious decision to perform this 
evasive action, since the reaction can be automatic (and indeed must be, for the sake of 
speed); yet the action expresses an intention to survive, and the descending fly swatter 
has a significance in relation to that intention. The human intends to kill the fly, or chase 
it away, but the fly does not need to know the human’s intention in order to take the 
evasive action. A social creature, on the other hand, often does need to be able to read (or 
imagine) the intentions of its conspecifics, who may even issue deliberate warnings as a 
substitute or prelude for more serious action. Either way, meaning refers to possible 
consequence and response. 
 This presupposes a system of values (survival is good) and the possibility of 
effective action (quick take off). The creature seeks out external conditions that permit 
internal conditions to remain within tolerable limits, and tries to avoid conditions that do 
not. Yet, evaluating significance doesn’t have to be conscious. It is enough that those 
creatures alone survive that are programmed in such a way that they take appropriate 
action with regard to various stimuli. When it is conscious, valuation is experienced as 
feeling and emotion. Cognitive science has tended to ignore the affective states that 
permeate all of human experience. Such a prejudice derives from the exclusion of the 
subject, the body, and “secondary” qualities from relevance in physics in favor of 
abstractions. 
 It would be incredible that mere physical stimulation should be imbued with 
meaning if the organism could do no more than receive physical energy and react as inert 
matter does through efficient causation [Dreyfus 2007]. However, the organism does far 
more than is suggested by stimulus and response. It acts in an environment full of 
consequence for it and assigns significance and meaning to stimuli according to its own 
values and criteria, which have been conditioned by natural selection. Its values reflect its 
evolutionary success, not necessarily reality as conceived by a scientific observer.14 Its 
nervous system evolved to guide adaptive behavior in a specific niche and for specific 
purposes, which is not the same as producing veridical perceptions [Hoffman 2011]. 
Color perception, for example, provides certain kinds of useful information, such as 
which fruits are ripe. It is less directly related to properties of light such as wavelength, or 
of surfaces, such as reflectance. The question of whether the world has color is not well-
formed, for color is not simply a property of objects, but involves the interaction of the 
world with the perceiving organism, according to the latter’s nature and needs. Yet, 
according to the principle of co-determination, the same may be said even of so-called 
primary qualities such a shape and size, position and time, and the very existence of 
“objects.”   
 It would not be surprising if we share cognitive biases with other creatures with 
which we also share most of our genetic makeup. Experiments with monkeys, showing 
their responses to various colors, shed light on some human preferences [Humphrey 
1976]. They also hint at the evolutionary meanings of color qualia themselves as “a 
species of affect-laden intentional activity” [Rovane 2000]. Following Darwin, we should 
expect that all phenomenal qualities reflect processes conducive to survival [Jackson 




7. Phenomenality and behavior 
 
I experience a tickle in the throat, and compulsively begin to cough. What is the relation 
between the tickle sensation and the behavior of coughing? Does the experience cause the 
behavior? Not in the usual sense of efficient causation, for modern science neither allows 
nor requires anything outside physical processes or entities as causally effective. Is the 
sensation epiphenomenal, playing no functional role? No, for the tickle sensation 
represents to the organism its state of readiness to cough. But, toward what end? We are 
not dealing with a merely causal system, but also with the reasons for an action.  
 The tickle represents a state of affairs to an agent that might act upon it 
independently of the coughing reflex. The sensation serves as an emblem of that reflex, 
as well as of the irritation, to inform the agent about the occurrence of both. The job of 
this agent is to monitor the state of the organism and the activities of various sub-
agencies, because it has executive powers to override the cough or to plan some other 
action to deal with the irritation that registers as a tickle. The executive function itself 
cannot be automated like the coughing reflex because automatisms are fixed algorithms 
that can deal only with well-defined situations to which they are adapted. The registering 
of the sensation bears information about the stimulus and the appropriate response, and 
constitutes a separate function independent of automated behavior.  
 Similarly, there is valuation and more or less programmed behavior associated 
with other sensations, such as itching, pain, hunger and thirst, sweetness, bitterness, or 
                                                
14 As one commentator wryly puts it: “Perception is not about truth, it’s about having kids” 
[Hoffman and Prakash 2014]. On the other hand, if all cognition is merely adaptive behavior, is 
science merely a strategy to have kids? 
attractive and repulsive odors. Certainly, these contain information about the proximal 
stimulus. The associated behavior contains the meaning to the organism of the 
sensation—that is, what it should do about the stimulus as a first response. Other 
sensations—such as provided by the distance senses—may lack obvious behavioral 
concomitants. What is the “meaning,” in the above sense, of specific color sensations, for 
example? While the answer may not be readily apparent, the question is not without 
sense. Rather, it then becomes more general: how does the organism establish the 
meaning to itself of its sensory input?  
 The single-celled organism can deal with physical contact with a reflex of 
withdrawal or engulfing. For complex creatures, more complex behavior is usually 
required, but it remains grounded in the biologically fundamental responses of approach 
and withdrawal. While behaviors of aversion and attraction need not involve 
consciousness, consciousness necessarily is grounded in the values behind such 
behaviors. Affect, with the judgments behind it, is therefore central to consciousness.  
The event with most immediate consequence for the organism is physical contact, 
of which the sense of touch yields a perception whose experienced quality is 
undifferentiated from the force of the contact itself [Jonas 1966/2001, p148]. At the 
primordial level, the affect and the behavior form an undifferentiated whole.15 Even the 
apparently disinterested information gathering by the distance senses has its evolutionary 
roots in the affective values of immediate feeling-response [Dennett 1991, p181].  
 The paradigm example is pain, which is at once feeling and response. To the 
organism, pain means the associated behaviors of withdrawal, avoidance, and protection 
of an injured part. But the pain response has two phases, corresponding to two neural 
pathways (c-fibers and a-fibers).16 One is a quick reflex reaction—for example, removal 
of the hand in response to contact with a hot surface. The slower response of lingering 
painful feeling reflects an ongoing, internally generated stimulus, which over time 
continues to acknowledge the tissue damage during the process of healing. The 
associated response is protective behavior. We might think of the ongoing nerve signal 
responsible for it as consisting of re-iterations of an initial undifferentiated impulse-
response: a persisting reverberation or reactivation loop [Humphrey 1992, p204-5]. The 
time integration of these reiterations constitutes the quality that signifies persisting 
damage and the process of repair—namely, the hurtfulness of the pain, which requires the 
organism to be mindful of the injury. This conscious experience of pain carries several 
implications: first, that the initial reflex was not sufficient to avoid injury; second, that the 
injured part must be favored during healing; third, the lesson to avoid such stimulus in 
future; and fourth, that the experience is not a passive reception but an active 
management of the situation.  
                                                
15 Herbert Spencer [1890] had a basic intuition that the key to affect as a phenomenal experience 
lay in the behavioral response associated with it. He postulated a primitive “shock,” an impulse in 
which feeling and response are united, and from which the brain may proceed to differentiate 
various sensations according to modality. 
16 As Dennett [1978, p200-202] points out, the physiology of pain is more complicated than this, 
involving separate channels through the “old brain” and the “new brain,” and also the possibility 
of other pathways influencing the experience of pain. This should not affect the argument here, 
which concerns the grounding of the felt quality of pain in the associated response.  
 On the basis of this kind of simplistic analysis, can we hope to understand in a 
similar way qualities such qualities as color, auditory tone, and smell, which do not seem 
to involve a reflex response or other associated behavior? The challenge is to understand 
the grounding of phenomenal qualities in affect. A reflex response to a proximal stimulus 
has direct benefit for a creature. However, on the example of pain, it is not this immediate 
reaction, but mediated valuation after the fact, which is salient for phenomenal qualities 
and upon which subsequent considered action can be based. This mediated valuation 
continues to carry with it the implied (but not actualized) immediate reaction. There is 
neurological evidence that phenomenal experience involves efferent as well as afferent 
nerves [Ellis 2000, p44].17  
 There is no immediate behavior associated, for example, with visible light of a 
given wavelength, which is generally too weak a stimulus to directly impact the organism 
by the sheer force of contact [Jonas, p29].18 (For visible wavelengths, the energy transfer 
involved in the encounter of a cell with a photon would be miniscule.) Especially for 
larger organisms, in order to lead to response such non-invasive stimulus must be 
interpreted as having a significance requiring considered action, which is not a reflex but 
complex behavior.  
 All nervous activity consists in the same sort of electrochemical signals, and all 
exteroceptors derive from the cell membrane of the organism. Visual receptors 
differentiate tissue and signal alike in such a way that light is no longer essentially a 
proximal stimulus with immediate import, but conveys information from a distance. It no 
longer bears the same implications, and engages a different level of response: monitoring 
and evaluating from afar. The distance senses are thus freed from the need for the 
immediate response implied in contact. Visual and aural qualities are accordingly 
dissociated from such response. Yet, plainly, auditory tone results from repeated 
iterations of a wave front impinging on the eardrum, while the single wave front is but a 
negligible or meaningless disturbance. The qualitative experience of tone emerges as 
many such events rapidly encountered are synthesized into an experience representing an 
overall texture. Similarly, a stable visual world emerges from repeated saccadic “takes” 
on the retinal surface, without which the visual field dissolves [Solms 2014, p183]. And, 
as we have noted, pain emerges from an ongoing reiterated stimulus that initially (as a 
single event) entailed but a reflex response. The brain integrates such repetitive micro-
events into a gestalt, with a texture that is a phenomenal quality. To what end?  
 While non-conscious mental processing occurs before the conscious experience it 
underlies, this does not render the conscious experience superfluous. Rather, the 
                                                
17 “Consciousness always involves efferent activity, defined as neural activity generated by the 
organism itself, for purposes of its own survival and well-being, rather than from passive 
stimulation by incoming sensory signals.” Cf. also [Humphrey 2000, p17-18]: “In order to be able 
to represent ‘what’s happening to me’, the animal must in fact continue to issue commands such 
as would produce an appropriate response at the right place on the body if they were to carry 
through into bodily behavior.” 
18 “The smallness (in dimension, time rate, and energy) of the unit-actions and reactions involved 
in affection of the senses… permits their mass-integration into one continuous and homogenous 
effect… Where qualities are perceived, the raw material is action: impacts, hustlings, clashes on a 
molecular scale. Organisms not far exceeding that scale can therefore have no perceptions, but the 
collision experience [sic] only.”  
conscious experience indicates recognition of that non-conscious processing, after the 
fact, by an executive function (the self). The persisting experience of pain serves not to 
avoid the original stimulus, but to avoid further damage and facilitate healing. It forces 
the organism to favor that part.19 The conscious experience serves a distinct purpose, with 
a different associated behavior than the pre-programmed response. Consciousness serves 
to monitor various activities of the nervous system, just as the computer user monitors the 
state of the central processor, interacting with it via desktop icons [Hoffman 2008]. It also 
serves a different purpose than its own underlying non-conscious processing, just as a 
computer desktop serves a different purpose than the computational processes that 
produce its pixels.  
 A partitioning of quick and slow pathways, similar to that of the pain response, 
seems to exist in the visual system too, where an initial fast wave of visual processing 
happens outside consciousness, and is made available to subsystems for immediate 
responses. This is followed by a slower phase of “recurrent processing” that involves 
integration of various brain areas leading to conscious experience [Revonsuo 2010]. Here 
too phenomenal qualities emerge from the reiteration of an original signal and serve a 
different purpose from it. 
 
 
8. The language of the senses 
 
Whatever the color red signifies to the organism may not be the same as what it did a 
million years ago, just as many words in Shakespeare’s plays do not have the same 
connotations to a modern as to an Elizabethan ear. Shakespearian scholars attempt to 
make up this deficit, and evolutionary scholars attempt to unravel the changing meanings 
of the language of the senses. The intentionality involved in color perception, for 
example, is deeply buried in the evolution of the primate visual sense. The very existence 
of color categories (hue) indicates an evolutionary significance, since they clearly reflect 
needs of the organism more than properties of light or reflective surfaces. While we have 
little need to be engaged by outdated behavioral correlates of color qualia, the very nature 
of the visual system is to divorce itself from immediate behavioral implications. We gain 
the detachment vision provides at the cost of access to the underlying subjectivity. 
Nevertheless, the challenge presented by the apparent objectivity of the visual sense is to 
understand how its qualities derive indirectly from affect: that is, to speculate on the 
behavioral meanings of phenomenal colors. Evolutionary advantage explains color 
discrimination—why things appear to be differently colored—but not why a particular 
wavelength of light appears just so and not otherwise. 
 Since the diets of Old World primates consisted significantly of fruits that were 
yellow, orange or red [Tsou 2013], it would make sense for these food items to stand out 
for our ancestors from a background of foliage. Subjectively, we tend to think of red as 
contrasting maximally with green. (Yellow is closer to green in wavelength—hence 
contrasts with it less than red—but also may indicate a less ripe fruit.) In the forest 
context, at least, the color red signifies something singular—whether a ripe fruit or a 
                                                
19 One might infer that insects, which do not seem to favor damaged parts, do not experience pain 
as a result of those injuries [Eisemann et al 1984]. Patients who pathologically cannot experience 
pain are at severe risk. 
poisonous creature [Dennett 1991, p385].20 But this still does not tell us why the 
chlorophyll of foliage does not appear red and the ripe fruit green, which would maintain 
the same relative contrast for discrimination. What is it about the qualitative feel of 
greenness that commends it to represent foliage in the vocabulary of the senses? And 
what about redness commends it to represent things that must stand out against that 
background?  
 The question may be likened to asking why a particular meaning is denoted in a 
particular language by a particular word, written and pronounced its particular way, 
rather than by some other symbol. For the native language user, the association seems 
natural and self-evident, though of course it is actually a social convention and a product 
of historical accident. The internal communication of the organism may be no less 
arbitrary in its choice of symbols. Some symbol must be chosen, and will inevitably come 
to seem imbued with the meaning it has been made to convey by convention. Thus, it is 
backwards to ask why grass “feels” green; rather greenness is what it is by virtue of the 
association with grass. Greenness is the way we visually experience the totality of 
associations related primarily to chlorophyll.  
 Moreover, like language, perception is motivated. Originally language may have 
served to alert or warn others. The first human vocal expressions were probably not so 
different from the excited alarm calls of primates and other animals. What makes fully 
grammatical language powerful is precisely its dissociation from fixed meanings and 
context, so that it may be used in a detached and flexible way. For the human being, 
capable of abstraction and bent on transcending the natural condition, the informing 
significance of many phenomenal qualities is no longer strictly compelled by the original 
urgencies from which they were derived. Yet, some colors continue to have affective 
values for human beings, as for their primate relatives. They can serve to capture 
attention, to convey information, and to bear an emotional charge. Monkeys tested for 
color preferences showed a preference for blue and green and an aversion to red, which 
agitated them. Red can signify a variety of quite different things. It may be precisely this 
ambiguity as a signal that imbues red with its characteristic charge, and creates anxiety in 
a situation that does not lend a natural interpretation.21 
 In any case, the sensation of redness (unlike the word) is not merely a linguistic 
convention subject to social change, but a convention of neuro-logical organization, with 
the force of long genetic precedent. Indeed, the human cognitive system adapts to 
distorting colored lenses or filters in such a way that subjective experience of verdant 
foliage, for example, is eventually restored to its normal greenness [Neitz, et al 2002]. 
While the words of a natural language have relatively transient definitions, the meanings 
of qualia are backed rather by evolutionary history. The sensation of redness is just what 
it is, and different than the sensation of greenness, precisely because of the real-world 
                                                
20 Other associations are possible, such as blood, or colorings related to sexuality, or the red of 
dusk when some predators hunt. No doubt all qualia involve a matrix of such associations, for 
which the quality itself stands summarily [Loorits 2014]. 
21 However, as Humphrey [1976] explains, the laboratory context must be taken into account, 
where the natural context for response cannot be re-created. 
things it refers to in our evolutionary history, from which it cannot be arbitrarily 
dissociated. This is why there can be no “inverted spectrum.”22 
 
 
9. Filling in 
 
A solution to the hard problem must include a theory of qualia.23 The qualities immanent 
in phenomenality (qualia) are far from “epiphenomenal” with regard to associated 
cognitive behavior, neural processing, or the physical facts that seem to be their objective 
counterparts. When we look at a source of green light, for instance, one should not 
imagine that one’s brain dispassionately assesses a frequency and then “colors in” that 
information with the superfluous quality of greenness. Rather, the experience itself of 
greenness is a qualitative estimation of frequency (among other things). Similarly, the 
perceived quality of a particular musical tone is itself an estimate of sound frequency, the 
experience of warmth or coldness an estimate of temperature, etc. Sensory qualities are 
thus not something gratuitously added to the information they represent, nor are they 
caused by it. Rather, they are a version of that information, synoptically presenting it to 
the executive function. Qualia, in other words, are a way the embodied subject first-
personally presents to herself physical information that an observer might also detect by 
means of laboratory equipment and describe in terms that are third-personal, physical, 
propositional, and quantitative. If the specific quality of greenness seems to convey 
privileged information beyond that involved in the public analysis of light, this is because 
(along with information about the world) it also bears information about the organism—
its priorities and evolutionary history, its habitat, its relationship to the world, and the 
internal communication that mediates that relationship. That information cannot be 
recovered merely from facts about the external world. 
 Propositional knowledge in general, and as conveyed in science, concerns 
perceived differences—that is, differences among qualia—which are construed to be 
differences in the world. Facts are thus based on phenomenal experience, but are not the 
experience itself. Qualia contain implicit information about structure in the world, which 
propositional knowledge renders explicit as “facts.” Qualia seem ineffable because, while 
they already recognize and refer to structure, they are themselves by nature structureless. 
Their function is to integrate differences or structure in such a way that the resulting 
quality stands for that information. Thus, they “fill in,” so to speak, between discrete 
events. 
 The brain smoothens over the jerkiness of eye saccades, for example, like it does 
the separate frames of a motion picture. Otherwise put, it fills in the continuity and 
stability of the visual field like it fills in the blind spot, and fills in the quality of a tone, 
integrated over successive wave fronts.24 The key point is that this “filling in” process 
does not perceive local continuity but asserts it. As Dennett [1992] has noted, the brain 
                                                
22 The ‘inverted spectrum’ is the “apparent possibility of two people sharing their color 
vocabulary and discriminations, although the colors one sees… are systematically different from 
the colors the other person sees.” [Wikipedia: inverted spectrum] 
23 Wikipedia defines qualia as “individual instances of subjective, conscious experience.” 
24 To be perceived as a tone, there must be a regular repetition of wave fronts hitting the eardrum. 
A single wave front impinging on it will not be experienced as a tone, if it registers at all.  
recognizes continuity in the world by disregarding the actual sensory discontinuity.25 If 
the brain can create such an appearance by simply asserting that it is so, then why not all 
appearances?  
 Only in anomalous circumstances do we even notice this sleight of mind. These 
circumstances include laboratory studies of perceptual completion effects, habituation, 
perceptual adaptations of various sorts, and phenomena of spatial projection—all of 
which are examples involving what I call acts of fiat. A feature of such effects is that the 
subject’s phenomenal experience typically seems to go beyond the facts or events that 
would be noted by an observer. That is, the subject’s brain invents what is “not really 
there” according to a bystander. I contend that qualities in general may be understood as 
such completion, adaptation, or projection effects, while offering the caveat that what is 
deemed “really there” involves a fundamental bias deriving from the scientific 
commitment to the third-person point of view. 
 “Filling in” is simply an unfelicitous way to describe a fundamental aspect of all 
perception, which may alternatively be described as an act of invention, positing, or fiat. 
It demonstrates the constructive capability of the brain, a basic process of interpolation 
[Crick and Koch 1992/2002, p15]. Numerous laboratory experiments demonstrate visual 
completion effects of various sorts.26 Other experiments demonstrate various forms of 
spatial and temporal projection. Still others (among which the famous experiments of 
Stratton, repeated in many variations) show the adaptability of the nervous system to 
restore perception that corresponds to functional behavior within an environment. Some 
lead to quite bizarre experiences, such as the disorientation first experienced by subjects 
wearing lenses that invert or reverse the optical input to the eyes; or the strange feeling of 
phantom limb that can be induced in the “rubber hand” experiment [Metzinger 2010; 
Botvnick & Cohen 1998]. Apparent motion effects are familiar in modern culture through 
motion pictures and illuminated signs. Such effects, which are usually artificially 
induced, are considered illusory when they involve perceptually jumping to a false 
conclusion. But the general lesson should be that all perception is naturally a matter of 
jumping to conclusions, whether warranted or not. Phenomenality might then be 
characterized as a useful illusion, a virtual reality realistically guided by sensory input. 
 The terms ‘filling-in’ and ‘completion effect’ are somewhat ambiguous, since they 
sometimes refer to what is experienced and sometimes to something the brain does. In the 
latter sense, there is evidence [Pessoa et al 1998] of a neurological basis for completion 
or filling-in, despite Dennett’s [1978] well-known objection that the brain simply ignores 
an absence. In the case of the blind spot, the experience of continuity of the visual field 
overrides a defect of physiological design. It is the brain’s way of representing to itself its 
(true) belief that, despite the blind spot, the external visual world is actually continuous. I 
hold that qualia in general are a result of the same sort of creative process as involved in 
the blind spot and other completion effects, all of which reflect a positive act of assertion. 
One might then wonder, in the general case, what the brain fills in between—just as in 
the case of the blind spot it fills in between the enervated retinal areas on either side of an 
un-enervated area. The answer must be that these functional adjacent areas too are filled 
                                                
25 His valid point is to distinguish, for example, between representing a continuous phenomenal 
field and representing that it is continuous. It is precisely the latter I claim as the normal basis of 
phenomenality.  
26 For a taxonomy of perceptual completion phenomena see [Pessoa et al 1998]. 
in, but on a finer scale (between receptors), and temporally as well as spatially. That is, 
the brain generally asserts continuity across discrete structures or events when their 
discreteness is irrelevant, just as it asserts continuity between frames of a motion picture. 
Phenomenal qualities are “filled in” just as the quality of being fifty years old is filled in 
between one’s fiftieth and fifty-first birthdays, virtually by edict.  
 
 
10. Perception of is perception that 
 
However complex the neural processes giving rise to them, qualia are essentially simple 
and integral gestalts [Crane 2000, p188]. This is so first of all because there is no 
conscious access to the underlying complex processes; but equally, because qualia are by 
nature syntheses that summate information without revealing its path history. Information 
is implicitly conveyed about wavelength of light, reflectance, sound frequency, etc.— 
which an observer can measure as quantities. But the succession of wave fronts of light 
or sound is integrated into a seamless emerging quality, which may then serve to 
represent more than these physical properties. One may speculate that qualia are built up 
essentially from primitive responses at a lower level, in the way that a digital image is 
built from pixels [MacLennan 2005]. Each “pixel” represents a simple judgment or 
assertion (1 or 0), but the image that emerges is an integration of that digital 
information,27 facilitating judgment and response on a higher level. The miniscule energy 
and individual import of discrete impulses (pixels) is absorbed into a larger synthesis 
with which the agent has a different relationship [Jonas 1966/2001, p29]. 
 Mental images are sparsely detailed, compared to perceptual images. But even the 
latter are only relatively detailed. The perception of dense or complete detail in sensory 
experience is illusory, since it is little more than the assertion that there is unlimited 
detail. The good faith of this assertion is backed up by the fact that the senses can access 
additional information about the external world upon demand, whereas mental images 
cannot.  
 Suppose I close my eyes and conjure a mental image of a printed page. Unless I 
have keen eidetic memory, I may note little more than the presence of typed letters in 
lines, without being able to read actual sentences. Perhaps words are only partially made 
out, and not even in a distinct typeface. In effect, what I “see” is that the imagined or 
recalled page contains printing, words, and sentences. Now I open my eyes and look at a 
real printed page in a language I know. I can access the actual words and sentences and 
read them by directing my foveal vision at a line of print, one phrase at a time. In my 
peripheral vision, however, the words may not be clear, though I may anticipate them 
because of context. Either way, reading a word is a matter of deciding that a particular 
configuration of marks on the page represents a word in the language I know, which in 
turn represents a particular meaning. Even when the individual word is clearly in focus, 
seeing is recognizing that something is the case. 
 Let’s say that now I notice a painting on a distant wall or in my peripheral vision. 
Though I may have seen it every day, peripherally or from a distance I recognize that it is 
a particular painting, with a variety of colors and of a certain size, but perceive little more 
until attention can search out more details with foveal vision. Noticing a “detail,” 
                                                
27 One ‘bit’ of information is literally a decision between ‘1’ or ‘0’. 
however, is much the same as noticing that it is a painting, but on a smaller scale: it is a 
matter of asserting a fact. The possibility to identify indefinitely many such details (by 
getting nearer, by directing the fovea, or by paying closer attention) distinguishes sensory 
perception from remembered imagery, imagination, or dreams. But the impression that 
perception reveals reality in full detail at a given moment is illusory [Crick and Koch 
1998, p99]. A glance takes in with clarity only a small portion of a repetitive pattern—on 
wallpaper, for example. Yet it seems subjectively (and falsely) as though one uniformly 
“sees” all the individual forms that are repeated [Dennett 1991, p354-5].28 I take this a 
step further to claim that it only seems (falsely) that we clearly see even the single 
isolated form!   
 In other words, perception in general is perception that rather than perception of. 
The latter, in fact, is scarcely a coherent notion. For it presupposes a read-made 
presentation of what exists, as though one passively surveys a panorama given in its 
entirety, while the challenge is to understand how the mind constructs that panorama. 
While this presupposition is the fundamental tenet of naïve realism, it is also is a belief of 
which we have been convinced, perhaps, by the objectifications of physics. But 
perception entails cognizing sensory input as we go along, following attention. It is an act 
of the organism, the momentary assertion of a proposition, a decision or judgment made 
about what is sensed. It may not be a final decision (as illustrated by the Necker cube and 
other ambivalent figures about which the brain cannot make up its mind); but in the 
moment, it is made with the tautological finality of all declarations by fiat, as in the 
mathematician’s “Let x stand for such and such…” and the divine “Let there be light!” 
This unequivocal action of assertion, which I call fiat, is the essence of mind and the 
basis of phenomenality, which cannot be understood so long as the organism, the brain, 
and matter at large are considered essentially passive. 
  
 
10. A note on qualia29 
 
The problems posed by qualia have aroused many passionate discussions in philosophy 
of mind [Armstrong 1999, p121]. This is scarcely surprising, since explaining qualia 
effectively is the hard problem [Crane 2000, p171]. Since perception of is perception that, 
it is sometimes argued (e.g., by Dennett [1991]) that qualia in themselves don’t exist. 
                                                
28 Dennett’s example is wallpaper by Andy Warhol, with a repeated image of Marilyn Monroe. 
Such an image is literally an icon, with limited detail, and easily identifiable. This is not the case 
with perception of a natural scene, which may be ambiguous and contains indefinite detail. 
29 According to Wikipedia, “qualia are individual instances of subjective, conscious experience.” 
In other words, they are the individualized contents of phenomenal experience. The term ‘qualia’ 
(singular ‘quale’) was first used in its modern sense by C. S. Peirce in 1866. But explicit focus on 
the role of qualia in the mind-body problem began in 1958 with Herbert Feigl’s The Mental and 
the Physical. [Crane 2000, p177-81] I sometimes avoid the term in favor of the more informal 
‘quality’—to emphasize the qualitative aspect of experience—a term that dates to usage by the 
early natural philosophers, who distinguished secondary qualities from the primary ones that were 
supposed to be quantitatively expressed. ‘Qualia’ has since been associated with the secondary 
qualities, in contrast to supposedly objective properties of the external world. 
  
That is, only propositional information exists. The notion of qualia is problematic—like 
the disgraced notion of ‘sense-data’. For, qualia are not normally objects of perception, 
but are the acts of perception itself. One does not ordinarily see such things as “color 
patches” or have “raw feels.” In other words, pure sensation is not normally factored out 
from perception. Yet it is possible, with special effort, to “deconstruct” features of visual 
experience, for example, to attend to color patches instead of colored objects. Painters 
routinely do this, and we are culturally accustomed to the idea of pure color through the 
use of paint. Some meditation techniques train the subject to relax the interpretive aspect 
of perception and focus on bodily sensations. However, color patches and raw feels are 
not the input to cognition but the result of special cognitive acts. In experimental 
situations, qualia are artifacts of the experimental set-up. (For example, one does not 
usually encounter monochromatic colors in nature, in isolation from objects and 
surfaces.) So, the notion of qualia hinges on self-conscious introspection and artificial 
conditions; but that hardly negates their phenomenal existence.   
 As pointed out already, phenomenality is a function of the organism interacting 
with physical reality. It is as much a property of the organism as of the world. This is why 
Jackson’s [1982] artificially sequestered scientist “Mary” can know everything there is to 
know about physical processes while not about qualia. Phenomenal experience is not 
deducible from physical facts alone, nor can it be reconstituted from such facts. This is 
because physical facts are denatured in the first place—distilled from phenomenal 
experience—and because consciousness is not a product of the object alone, but of the 
subject and object together. 
 
 
11. Summary conclusion 
 
I have assembled threads of an admittedly loose argument, that to solve the hard problem 
it is necessary to take the point of view of the organism and its subagents. However, what 
is necessary may not be sufficient.  
 In any case, it is useful to try to understand—from the inside, as it were—how the 
organism constructs its own first-person point of view and phenomenality. The organism 
does this through acts of fiat that an observer can translate as propositional assertions. 
The brain creates phenomenality in a parallel way to how it creates meaning in language, 
through the use of symbols to which it assigns meaning in the context of an embodied 
evolutionary history. Phenomenality is an internal representation, to itself, by an 
executive agent (the conscious self), which is tasked with monitoring the state of the 
organism and its environment, planning future action, and coordinating various sub-
agencies. I have tried to show in principle how such an agent can and must be conscious. 
Does this sketch succeed in providing the basis for a scientific solution to the hard 
problem? Short of that, does it suffice at least to appease the intuitive sense of an 
explanatory gulf?  
 The first question must be answered negatively for science as it stands, which 
excludes a first-person perspective by definition. The limiting exclusion of notions of 
causality other than efficient cause, the view of matter as fundamentally inert, and the 
paradoxes of objectivity, may eventually lead to changes in the scientific program. But 
until then, consciousness is bound to elude its constrictive net. Yet, even if these 
conditions could be remedied, there might still seem to remain an explanatory gap. To 
liken the creation of phenomenality to the creation of meaning in language may simply be 
restating the problem in other terms. For there then remains the question of how words 
can evoke mental images. My answer is: by fiat! But to some that may seem circular—no 
answer at all, let alone a scientific one. 
 Because the second question has a subjective and individual dimension, some 
readers more than others may find satisfaction in the approach presented here. As the 
author [Chalmers 1995] who coined the term ‘hard problem’ has put it, one may still feel 
that there remains a sense in which no approach can tell us why there is phenomenal 
experience at all. Yet, he is quick to add: “But this is the same for any fundamental 
theory. Nothing in physics tells us why there is matter in the first place, but we do not 
count this against theories of matter.” Despite scientific advancements, we may never 
have an answer to the mystery of why anything exists at all. Similarly, we may never 
have an answer to the mystery of how there can be consciousness of it. Indeed, it is only 
the reflexivity of the conscious mind that gives rise to such questions, and it may be this 
very reflexivity that renders an answer to them perpetually elusive. Yet, even if the very 
nature of consciousness poses limits to an understanding of itself and the world, there is 
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